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Youth in Africa: Between Marginalisation and Demographic Dividend 
 
Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa 
 
(Zziyika and Associates LLC & Cornell University) 
 
 
Since the 1980s, most African countries have experienced demographic shifts that have resulted in 
young populations, creating the possibility of youth marginalisation, but also a potential 
demographic dividend. The lack of social and economic opportunities generates unease about youths’ 
future and anger and loathing towards society and government, heightening the risk of uprisings as 
witnessed during the Arab Spring. Governments have become aware of the inefficacy of existing 
policies designed to advance the welfare of the ever-increasing youth population, and look to change 
this by formulating inclusive policies, often with support from the international community, to 
harness youth potential. The African Youth Charter defines youth as those aged between 15-35 years, 
encompassing groups with different social, economic and political needs. The heterogeneity of this 
group makes policy formulation complex, resulting in poorly designed and ill-suited policies that fail 
to address the diverse and multi-facetted causes of youth violence. While SSA governments express 
concern about escalating youth violence, their macroeconomic policies are not well targeted at youth 
needs and create further agitation among the youth demographic. Some youths see contesting for 
political office as a solution to these challenges. However, the social, political and economic diversity 
of young voters hampers such solutions, as youthful candidates do not appeal to all young voters. 
Looking ahead, to harness the demographic dividend will require reforms and investments, 
especially targeted at the youth, including in ICT, youth empowerment programmes, quality 
education and healthcare. The goal is to better equip the youths for present and future challenges. 
 
 
1. Introduction1 
 
Africa’s youth are today caught between political and economic exclusion and the hope of an 
effervescent, globalised and affluent future that everyone, including government leaders, 
says awaits them (Lopes, 2013). Unencumbered by the trappings of political power, the 
youth have not desisted from rattling the existing order – as indicated by the Arab Spring 
and similar, if lower scale, insurrections in the rest of Africa. Although youth disaffection 
with the status quo currently runs deep, the young people’s relative marginalisation and lack 
of influence are today providing a greater degree of youthful solidarity and political activism 
                                                          
1 This discussion note draws on the lecture I gave at Cornell University, Ithaca, on 21 March 2019 as part of the 
Spring 2019 seminar series of the Institute for African Development, where I am also a Visiting Fellow. I thank 
participants for their comments and the Institute’s Director, Prof. Muna Ndulo, for his support. 
Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa, ‘Youth and Demographic Dividend in Africa’  
 16 
than in the past. This has emerged in spite of the amorphous nature of the youth as a group 
and the broad differences in their age composition, status, upbringing (i.e. rural, urban, poor, 
rich) and gender. 
While the youth are seen as the custodians of Africa’s future (African Union, 2006), 
they are at the same time derided by governments for their ‘disruptive’ behaviour and 
‘threats’ to political stability (The Independent, 2016) – restiveness, armed rebellion, and 
gender-based violence have indeed become part of the continent’s youth narrative. The 
recent growth surge and modernisation drive have not translated into jobs for the youthful 
population and a return to agriculture, which many young people have long deserted, is 
sometimes seen, by governments and development agencies, as the solution to the 
unemployment problem, although the level of skepticism is rising (Economic Commission 
for Africa, 2009; Johnston, Ives & Lobo, 2011). 
Africa’s policy debate has been enlivened, even as youth disgruntlement has escalated 
in recent years, by the prospect of a substantial demographic dividend emanating from the 
strategic deployment of its young people (Economic Commission for Africa, 2013). It is 
feared, however, that a broad youth insurgence might disrupt social harmony and reverse 
the size of the dividend. This could be countered by thoughtful and inclusive public policies, 
ensuring a better future for Africa’s young people.  
This discussion note looks at how African countries have responded to youthful 
political and economic demands, in light of their political economy and capacity constraints.  
 
2. Youthful Ambiguity  
 
The term ‘youth’ is today associated with a range of socially-tinged attributes in Africa, i.e. 
‘social malcontents’; ‘rebels in search of a cause’; and, in the opposite direction, ‘young 
nationalists’ and ‘the continent’s future’ (Ukeje & Iwilade, 2012). Some domestic observers 
have gone as far as blaming the youth insurrection on foreign interference, and the ease with 
which ‘unAfrican’ ideas and values are disseminated in the 24/7 media world of today 
(Abanyam, 2013).  
The dichotomy is also partly to blame on differences in official conceptions of the 
youth, with some African countries underlining the importance of keeping the notion of rites 
of passage in mind when designating cut-off points for the various age cohorts. The African 
Youth Charter, launched by the African Union in 2006, set the youth age bracket at 15-35 
years, while the UN, for statistical purposes, defined the ‘youth’ as those aged 15-24 years. 
Nigeria’s national youth policy from 2009 set the bracket at 18-35 years, while Benin set it 
at 12-35 years in 2001. On the other hand, Angola, in 2005, eschewed the age bracket 
altogether in proposing its youth policy, focusing instead on the group’s composition, i.e. 
students, unemployed youth, sex workers, etc.2 Typically, the youth bracket not only includes 
                                                          
2 For an overview of national youth policies from around the globe, see: www.youthpolicy.org 
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minors but also household heads, seasoned professionals and/or budding politicians. Hence, 
while the ‘youth’ moniker suggests a well-defined and homogeneous group within the 
broader population, it has proven too fuzzy a concept for the mobilisation of young people 
or the design and targeting of public interventions. The wide age variance suggests, in spite 
appearances, that the youth’s claim to homogeneity is scantier than assumed. It is sensible, 
as suggested by Goldstone & Day (2012), to consider age-cohorts within the larger youth 
group as the relevant point of departure, as they would have more political and economic 
affinity, and hence be more amenable to the coming-of-age sentiment. 
If the African Union definition above is used, the African youth population is about 35 
percent of the total population of some 1.29 billion (but only about 20 percent if the 
narrower UN definition is used instead). In terms of region, given that the median ages of 
low-income Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries lie between 15 and 18 years, an 
unprecedented youth boom is expected there in the next decade. The middle-income 
countries of north and southern Africa have median ages above 25 years and the youth 
expansion will not be as dramatic. The fact that the youth-cohort in the latter region is older, 
employed and/or transcending into family life, and hence more politically alert and 
impactful, could explain why the Arab Spring happened there and not in SSA, where poverty 
is more acute, but where there might not be enough ‘youth’, in the right age bracket, to 
sustain a rebellion.  
 
3. Youth Violence 
 
Youth violence, though closely associated with today’s young people, is not new in Africa 
(Waller, 2006). Sharp increases in rural-urban migration in the 1960s, as colonial-era 
restrictions to urban residence were revoked, led to spikes in petty crimes and urban 
thuggery in the face of high unemployment, lack of housing and poor access to social services 
(de Lemos and Moore, 1965; Leys, 1965). Still, in retrospect, youth violence was more of a 
social irritant at the time than a threat to social and political stability as it is today.  
Recent years have seen youth violence achieve a greater disruptive potency across 
the continent (Heilbrunn, 2006; Blattman, 2009). Besides the ‘youth bulge’ itself, the causes 
include: rapidly expanding and unplanned urbanisation, leading to the ghettoisation of most 
large cities; mass unemployment and economic informalisation; the rise of religious 
fundamentalism; the paucity and declining quality of social services; frictions arising from 
rising poverty and inequality, including gender gaps; a greater sense of insecurity and 
victimisation related to small-arms proliferation in SSA, and related illicit drug activities; and 
the de facto pauperisation of the state owing to feeble finances, etc. There is hence a 
multifaceted link between socioeconomic factors and youth violence in Africa, i.e. involving 
personal, situational, socioeconomic, political, psycho-cultural and historical factors that 
require an equally multidimensional approach from governments. The endogeneity of the 
above factors raises formidable analytical and policy hurdles in assessing the impact of 
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discretionary public policy on the well-being of the youth in Africa (Boudreaux, et al., 2015; 
Marsh, 2007). 
However, youth policies are often poorly designed and ill-suited for addressing the 
many-sided challenges of development (Muthee, 2010). In many cases, youth violence is 
seen as an isolated challenge, with specific socioeconomic demands, rather than as part of 
the broader challenge of social inclusion. Gender-based violence, while in many cases 
involving the youth – as both perpetrators and victims – is often seen as another policy 
challenge altogether and not as part of the discourse on youth violence (Douglas, 2000). A 
more nuanced discussion of youth violence requires a good understanding of the ‘micro-
macro’ linkages and the nature of power structures – that, for example, enable the use of 
gender-based violence as a weapon of war (Sommers, 2015).  
On the other hand, governments do not wish youth violence to escalate – as it affects 
tax income streams and the development agenda more broadly. In the SSA context, few 
governments could survive the persistent onslaught of well-mobilised youth groups. 
Governments have expended substantial effort in trying to prevent the escalation of youth 
violence – even eliciting the support of the international community. However, examples 
from Uganda (Swahn, et al., 2015), Cote d’Ivoire (Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2018; Daddieh, 2016) 
and South Africa (Schuld, 2013) indicate that policies to address youth violence cannot be of 
the cookie-cutter variety. They must employ local knowledge and innovation and be 
inclusive to succeed. In Northern Uganda, for example, elaborate ritual cleansing ceremonies 
enabled the youth, even those that committed egregious acts of violence in the past, to return 
to their families and communities and lead normal lives. 
The complexity of the causes of youth violence in Sub-Saharan Africa in turn 
complicates the design of public policy responses more generally – notably the decisions on 
where policymakers, given resource constraints, should make their entry points and focus 
resources. For example, the choice of whether to intervene at the level of infant and maternal 
health (improving mother’s health and nutrition) or that of skills development at post-
primary school levels; focusing on addressing youth mental health issues on an extensive 
scale; strengthening the implementation of the penal code and increasing the size of the 
police force; or creating job opportunities, including public works programmes for the 
restive youth.  
Lastly, youth violence is prevalent in poor macroeconomic policy environments, as 
young people see a rapid diminution of their earnings, rising insecurity and a dimmer view 
of the future. Good economic policies that promote growth and provide employment 
opportunities are important preconditions for the success of anti-youth violence policies.  
 
4. Youth and Politics: Not Too Young to Run 
 
It has been argued that political parties based on the youth concept are implausible because 
‘youth’ is not a social class à la the peasantry, but a microcosm of the total population – 
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among them are farmers, students, teachers, soldiers, prisoners, slum dwellers, politicians, 
etc. However, commensurate with their superior numbers, the youth have been demanding 
more influence on social, economic and political issues in their countries than ever before. 
Predictably, governments and civil society have sought to contain youth disaffection by 
appealing to young people’s nationalism and love of country, urging them to desist from acts 
of destabilisation and violence as they await their ‘turn’, i.e. recent youth disgruntlement has 
largely been interpreted in political terms. Music has been a particularly effective medium 
for expressing political discontent and mobilising the youth (Perullo, 2011). 
In many African countries, electoral cycles have tended to fan youth violence as a 
matter of course, with politicians using young people as their foot soldiers during elections, 
but abandoning them when the job is done. This breeds a level of cynicism among the youth 
that could have (and indeed has had) debilitating consequences (Musya, et al., 2017; Collier 
& Vicente, 2012). 
To address youth restiveness, policymakers have responded with a wide variety of 
policies, emphasising social inclusion and economic empowerment. However, the political 
economy has been stark, with youth rights provisions and inclusive policies in social service 
provision hampered by the paucity of jobs and adverse legislation targeted at the freedom 
of the press and social media. The questions what role the youth should play in their 
countries and how the generational communication deficit should be addressed remain 
largely unanswered.  
Governments have sought to contain youth disaffection by appealing to young 
people’s nationalism and love of country and by formulating new national youth policies or 
refurbishing older ones. The latter have borrowed from the African Youth Charter mentioned 
above, including its emphasis on youth rights and freedoms. It urges state parties to ensure 
that “every young person should have the right to social, economic, and political and cultural 
development” and that all planning and decision-making should integrate and mainstream a 
youth perspective. 
Political admonitions aside, national youth policies have thus far had limited impact 
on youth welfare or their attitude toward governments. Given resource constraints, 
governments, development partners and NGOs have tended to focus on more tractable 
subgroups, i.e. rural youth, ex-combatants, unskilled workers, sex workers, slum dwellers, 
school dropouts, etc. while leaving others, considered better-endowed, such as university 
students, to fend for themselves. On their own, such piecemeal interventions have limited 
traction at the macro-level, underlining the danger of seeing the youth challenge as not part 
of broader social and political inclusion.  
With respect to youth in politics, a potent question is the extent to which effective 
youth coalitions could coalesce around common grievances and influence government 
policies (Goldstone & Day, 2012). In Nigeria’s recently concluded federal elections, the youth 
expressed their consternation at being virtually excluded from vying for top office (top 
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candidates were all above 70) by using the hashtag #Not Too Young to Run.3 As there have 
been similar outcomes in many other countries in recent years, the youth think that 
establishing their own political vehicles might be the way out of their present quandary.  
The example of South Africa’s Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) shows, however, 
that it is easier to establish a political foothold in a vibrant democracy than in a country 
where youthful ambition could be misconstrued for an attempt to overthrow the established 
order (Daniel, 2018). A political challenge for the youth in many African countries will 
therefore be how to transform their movements from pushing the causes of the moment, 
such as anti-corruption and anti-poverty, into effective political party structures, with 
manifestos that transcend the grievances that helped launch the movement in the first place. 
 
5. Harnessing the Demographic Dividend 
 
Africa’s demographic dividend will be determined by how well countries are able to harness 
the social and technical capabilities of their young populations (Swaniker, 2017; Republic of 
South Africa, 2011; Williams, 2012). It will require reforms that generate sustainable growth, 
adoption of new technologies, and the provision of quality education and health services to 
boost productivity. The demographic dividend cannot be harvested in a vacuum and 
strategies are needed to create a conducive environment for youth participation.   
However, youth expansion is happening in an environment of institutional weakness 
and fiscal fragility in many countries, with high rates of unemployment and a paucity of social 
services. While these constraints also affect other groups in the economy, the youth, lacking 
assets and steady sources of income, and often with limited access to credit and financial 
networks, feel quite marginalised and exceptionally vulnerable. Although recent youth 
cohorts are much better educated than their elders, their ability to contribute to growth is 
often severely constrained. Because youth concerns are sometimes seen as targeting a 
narrower section of the population, youth policies are often drafted in proforma fashion – 
partly intended to impress the international community that finances a portion of the youth 
portfolio – but with little budgetary traction. Success requires more domestic stakeholder 
involvement and heightened participation by civil society, including the youth themselves, 
and better integration with the much broader national development plans.  
While Africa’s youth, like their counterparts elsewhere, have been fervent at adopting 
social media and other ICT-related technologies, African governments have been much more 
restrained in their response, in some cases imposing taxes on social media.4 In contrast, the 
East Asian economies used the youth’s enthusiasm for ICT to create information and 
knowledge generating platforms that helped them leapfrog to the frontier in research, health 
                                                          
3 In 2018, President Buhari of Nigeria signed the legal provision for reducing the lower age limit for presidential 
contenders to 40 years in 2018. It did not affect the final line-up of candidates for the 2019 election much.  
4 For example, President Museveni (2018) of Uganda introduced a tax on social media, partly because he is of 
the view that it is too gossipy and partly because it was a convenient way to raise revenue. 
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and education service provision, logistics, and environmental protection, and to create 
modern jobs for their people.5 While this approach is being promoted in some of the recent 
national development plans on the continent (Republic of Uganda, 2016), the East Asian 
enthusiasm and focus on technology is still lacking. However, Africa’s youth are much better 
educated and more tech-savvy today than ever before and the diaspora is beginning to do 
for the continent, in terms of remittances and transfer of technology, what the Asian one has 
done for its region for decades. There is thus room for optimism. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
While there is not a country in Africa today that has not tried to respond to youth demands 
in one form or the other, in reality few African governments envision the youth challenge as 
a labour of love, rather as an exogenous threat to the body politic that must be eliminated. 
Experience suggests that there is a tendency for youth-targeted policies to be generic, poorly 
funded and lacking in operational concreteness and finesse. Few countries attempt to assess 
whether the policy targets they set in their youth policy frameworks are achieved. The 
political inclusion that the youth are demanding is often not forthcoming. 
Thus, in spite of the creation of youth forums, ministries of youth and special-purpose 
vehicles focused on youth matters, the level of youth disgruntlement in many African 
countries is on the increase with ripple effects on the rest of the population. This is mostly 
because ‘youth matters’ such as unemployment, poverty and hunger are also affecting the 
rest of the population. You cannot realistically deal with youth concerns, without addressing 
them in the broader population. In this regard youth pressure is good for public policy, but 
destabilising for domestic politics. 
The youth are adamant that real change can only happen when they access real 
power. However, while the youth have proven effective in pushing national causes, including 
anti-corruption, traditional party politics require the creation of formal structures – and 
hence a transition from largely voluntary activities to political contestation (and horse 
trading). The traditional parties consider the youth perceptibly ‘too young to run’ and will 
not help. Establishing their own political vehicles will not be easy, however.  
With regard to the demographic dividend, it is ironical that Africa’s youth ‘bulge’, 
considered a policy headache today, is actually the result of the continent’s success in 
reversing the triple curse of ‘poverty, ignorance and disease’ inherited at independence. 
Notably, child and maternal mortality were radically decreased in subsequent decades, 
thanks to better education, health services and nutrition. Nothing suggests that such positive 
impacts will not recur in the future, enabling Africa to harvest the demographic dividend on 
a sustainable basis. 
                                                          
5 South Korea has been a leader in this regard. The Korean Education Research and Information Service (KERIS) 
has spearheaded the country’s transformation into an information-based society. 
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